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Making good cider out of bad apples — Signaling expectations boosts
cooperation among would-be free riders
Michiru Nagatsu∗ Karen Larsen† Mia Karabegovic‡ Marcell Székely§ Dan Mønster¶
John Michael‖
Abstract
The present study investigates how group-cooperation heuristics boost voluntary contributions in a repeated public goods
game. We manipulate two separate factors in a two-person public goods game: i) group composition (Selﬁsh Subjects vs.
Conditional Cooperators) and ii) common knowledge about group composition (Information vs. No Information). In addition,
we let the subjects signal expectations of the other’s contributions in the experiment’s second phase. Common knowledge of
Selﬁsh type alone slightly dampens contributions but dramatically increases contributions when signaling of expectations is
allowed. The results suggest that group-cooperation heuristics are triggered when two factors are jointly salient to the agent:
(i) that there is no one to free-ride on; and (ii) that the other wants to cooperate because of (i). We highlight the potential
eﬀectiveness of group-cooperation heuristics and propose solution thinking as the schema of reasoning underlying the heuristics.
The high correlation between expectations and actual contributions is compatible with the existence of default preference to
satisfy others’ expectations (or to avoid disappointing them), but the stark end-game eﬀect suggests that group-cooperation
heuristics, at least among selﬁsh players, function ultimately to beneﬁt material self-interest rather than to just please others.
Keywords: group-cooperation heuristics, public goods, group composition, expectations, solution thinking
1 Introduction
In the literature on the voluntary provision of public goods
in the public goods game (PG hereafter), experimental and
econometric innovations have led to an increasing appre-
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ciation of the heterogeneity of subjects’ attitudes and ap-
proaches toward cooperation (Fischbacher et al. 2001; Bur-
land & Guala 2005; Bardsley and Moﬀatt 2007). As a
result, it has become standard to distinguish among various
“types” of subjects, such as “free-riders” (or “selﬁsh play-
ers”), who behave uncooperatively regardless of what others
do and “conditional cooperators” who cooperate as long as
they believe that others will do the same. These develop-
ments have stimulated various studies focusing on the eﬀect
of group composition (i.e., consisting of similar or diﬀerent
types of subjects) on voluntary contributions in PG, giving
rise to some interesting regularities. For example, Gächter &
Thöni (2005) found that those with the highest cooperative
tendency (identiﬁed as such in a prior ranking experiment)
cooperated more when they were sorted with “like-minded”
subjects and knew this, than in an unsorted treatment. This
may not be surprising for conditional cooperators, given that
they have more reason to expect others to cooperate (and
therefore more reason to cooperate) in the sorted treatment
than in the unsorted treatment, when the sorting mechanism
is common knowledge. But it does underscore the impor-
tance of group composition, and also of expectations arising
from group composition, in modulating voluntary contribu-
tions to public goods in PG (see also Fischbacher & Gächter
2010; de Oliveira et al. 2014).
More surprisingly, Gächter and Thöni (2005) also found
that subjects with the lowest cooperative tendency also co-
operated more in the sorted treatment than in the randomly
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matched treatment. Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2007: 313) re-
port a similar result, even when subjects did not know about
the sorting rule. What is going on here? Social psychol-
ogists have long known about in-group favoritism. This is
people’s tendency to behave cooperatively with others who
belong to the same group, even when the group aﬃliation
in question is imposed exogenously and arbitrarily using the
so-called minimal group paradigm (see e.g., Wit & Wilke
1992 for a case in PG; more generally Billig & Tajfel 1973;
Brewer 1979). But what is puzzling about the case at hand
is that these subjects are sorted precisely because of their
uncooperative tendency and yet they nevertheless cooperate
more than in a non-sorted treatment. Is this due to in-group
favoritism of some sort, or to some other cause?
The present study addresses this question by investigat-
ing the eﬀects of (a) information about group composition
and (b) signaling of expectations about each other’s con-
tributions. To anticipate our results, we found a negative
eﬀect of common knowledge of each other’s type on selﬁsh
subjects’ contribution level, but a remarkably positive eﬀect
of common knowledge once the signaling of expectations
about each other’s contributions was allowed. This indicates
that the higher cooperation among like-minded selﬁsh play-
ers is not triggered by blind in-group favoritism, or some
conformity bias, but rather by group-cooperation heuristics
activated by beliefs that such cooperation is mutually prof-
itable and sustainable (up to a certain point), and that the
others see it this way too.
We proceed as follows: ﬁrst we motivate our experimental
design as a way forward towards systematically uncovering
the mechanism of group-cooperation heuristics (Section 2).
Next, we describe our experimental design and implementa-
tion (Section 3). We then report the results (Section 4), and
conclude by discussing their implications and limitations,
proposing solution thinking as a schematic explanation of
how group-cooperation heuristics work in social dilemmas
(Section 5).
2 Group-cooperation heuristics and
their mechanisms
Gächter and Thöni (2005) identify two possiblemechanisms,
which are not necessarily mutually exclusive, to explain the
puzzling ﬁnding that their least cooperative subjects cooper-
ated more in a “like-minded” group than in a heterogeneous
group. Taking this as our starting point, we develop our new
experimental design to investigate the mechanisms underly-
ing cooperation of a group of otherwise selﬁsh subjects.
2.1 Group-cooperation heuristics
The ﬁrst possible mechanism that Gächter and Thöni (2005)
identify is that their “like-minded” group manipulation
may have triggered a boundedly rational group-cooperation
heuristics (Selten & Stoecker 1986) among these least co-
operative subjects: “LOW contributors [i.e., those whose
contribution level was the lowest one third in the one-shot
PG called the Ranking experiment, which preceded the main
experiment] have revealed to each other, that they chose
the money-maximizing strategy in the Ranking experiment.
They may therefore believe that there are no cooperators
around to free ride on. Thus, they understand that they need
to cooperate among themselves if they want to earn money.”
(Gächter & Thöni 2005, 310–311) In other words, the selﬁsh
subjects’ common knowledge that they had been grouped to-
gether on the basis of their previous low contributions made
it salient that it would not be possible to free-ride. If this is
the case, then it should be possible to reduce contributions by
depriving subjects of information about each others’ types,
since doing so would obscure the recognition that “there are
no cooperators around to free ride on.” However, as Jin &
Yamagishi (1997) claim, an additional condition may need
to be satisﬁed in order for such a group-cooperation heuris-
tics to be triggered. For it is one thing to recognize (i) that
mutual cooperation is preferred to mutual defection given
that free-riding is not possible; it is quite another to believe
(ii) that others expect mutual cooperation by recognizing (i).
Without some conﬁdence in (ii), cooperation may be a risky
strategy.
One of the main contributions of our study is to system-
atically investigate the relation between conditions (i) and
(ii) by introducing mutual signaling of expectations as an
operationalization of (ii). We specify the following two sce-
narios under which the group-cooperation heuristics may be
triggered among selﬁsh subjects (SSs):
Scenario 1: If both (i) and (ii) are interdependent (viz.
independently insuﬃcient but jointly suﬃcient) conditions,
then:
1.a we expect SSs to cooperate when both (i) and (ii) are
satisﬁed
1.b we expect SSs to not cooperatewhen (i) is satisﬁed (with
common knowledge) but (ii) is not satisﬁed (without
signaling expectations)
1.c we expect SSs to not cooperate when (i) is not satisﬁed
(without common knowledge) but (ii) is satisﬁed (with
signaling expectations).
Alternatively,
Scenario 2: If (i) and (ii) are independent triggering condi-
tions, the eﬀects of common knowledge and signaling should
be additive and then:
2.a we expect SSs to cooperate when both (i) and (ii) are
satisﬁed,
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2.b we expect SSs to cooperate (but less than in (2.a)) when
(i) is satisﬁed (with common knowledge) but (ii) is not
satisﬁed (without signaling expectations)
2.c we expect SSs to cooperate (but less than in (2.a)) when
(i) is not satisﬁed (without common knowledge) but (ii)
is satisﬁed (with signaling expectations)
The possibility that signaling of expectations alone may
weakly but independently trigger group-cooperation heuris-
tics (that is, scenario 2.c above) is motivated by the hypothe-
sis, recently put forward by Heintz et al. (2015), that people
have a default preference for fulﬁlling others’ expectations
(or for avoiding disappointing others’ expectations). In sup-
port of this conjecture, Heintz and colleagues observed that a
majority of dictators in a dictator gamemodulated their trans-
fer to more closely match expectation that their respective
receivers had indicated, when they learned of these expec-
tations (provided they were not unreasonable). Heintz et al.
also argue that this conjecture is supported by results from
a study by Dana et al. (2006). In Experiment 1 of Dana
and colleagues’ study, the subject playing the role of dic-
tator could pay $1 in order to exit from the game without
the receiver knowing that the game had taken place. Many
(about one-third) of the subjects did indeed choose this op-
tion. In Experiment 2, dictators were again oﬀered a $1
exit option, but in this case it was clear that receivers would
never know that a dictator game had taken place (i.e., any
transfers would be surreptitiously added to a reward for a
diﬀerent task). In this setup, almost no dictator accepted the
option or made any transfer. Thus, Dana and colleagues, like
Heintz and colleagues, surmise that a default preference to
fulﬁll others’ expectations (or to avoid disappointing them)
provides a compelling explanation of the ﬁnding that dic-
tators transfer anything at all in typical dictator games (see
Camerer, 2003; Ockenfels & Werner, 2014, for similar dis-
cussions). If Heintz and colleagues’ conjecture is correct,
then we should expect that signaling of expectations would
increase selﬁsh players’ contributions in PG even when it
is not common knowledge that they have been grouped to-
gether with other selﬁsh players (i.e., even when condition
(i) is not satisﬁed as in 2.c above); moreover, their contribu-
tions should be highly correlated with the amount that their
partners expect them to contribute.
2.2 Strategic cooperation
Before describing our experimental design in detail, let us
brieﬂy consider the second possible mechanism of cooper-
ation among selﬁsh players identiﬁed by Gächter & Thöni
(2005). Although our main focus in this study is the mecha-
nism of group-cooperation heuristics, it is important to con-
sider this second possible mechanism insofar as it could in
principle present a relevant confounder. The mechanism in
question concerns rational cooperation in a ﬁnitely repeated
social dilemma (Kreps et al. 1982):
LOW contributors actually believe that some other
LOW contributors invested nothing in the Rank-
ing experiment not because they are free riders,
but because they are conditional cooperators with
pessimistic beliefs. Then LOW contributors have
an incentive to cooperate strategically until the
ninth period to induce the conditional coopera-
tors to contribute. They free ride in the ﬁnal
period, when cooperation is not in their rational
self-interest anymore. Thus, if for whatever rea-
son LOW contributors believe that some others are
conditional cooperators, then rational cooperation
is possible even in a ﬁnitely repeated cooperation
game. (Gächter & Thöni, 2005, p. 311)
Note that this possibility crucially depends on the ambiguity
about the exact types of other players. Gächter & Thöni’s
(2005) sorting rule leaves room for this ambiguity: subjects
were sorted into HIGH, MIDDLE, and LOW contributors
based on the level of contributions in their Ranking exper-
iment. This way of grouping subjects cannot discriminate
conditional cooperators with pessimistic beliefs from selﬁsh
players, because their behavior — low contributions — is
equally compatible with both types.1
In order to control for this mechanism, and to focus on
the mechanism of group-cooperation heuristics, we adopt a
more ﬁne-tuned sorting procedure, following de Oliveira et
al. (2014), who removed type ambiguity by adopting, as
a sorting procedure, the strategy-elicitation method (Fis-
chbacher et al. 2001) in a separate online (incentivized)
game. This procedure reveals the strategies underlying a
subject’s decisions, by asking him/her to state what he/she
would contribute for each possible contribution level of the
other(s), and thus makes it possible to identify selﬁsh players
while controlling for beliefs. So, when this more nuanced
and precise information is common knowledge, the possibil-
ity of rational cooperation under uncertainty about others’
types should be eﬀectively removed. In contrast, without
common knowledge, this mechanism should be activated.
Our ﬁne-tuned sorting procedure and systematic manipula-
tion of common knowledge enable us to home in on group-
cooperation heuristics as the source of selﬁsh players’ pos-
itive contributions under common knowledge, and thereby
to rule out the potential confounder presented by Gächter &
Thöni’s (2005) second proposed mechanism.
2.3 Summary of our schema
Group-cooperation heuristics =
Condition (i): realization of impossibility of free-
riding and need to cooperate to make money. (Op-
1A more recent study by Junikka et al. (2017) has the same problem.
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erationalized as YES when it is common knowl-
edge that both are typed as selﬁsh; NO when com-
mon knowledge is removed)
+
Condition (ii): realization of others’ expectation of
mutual cooperation (Operationalized asYESwhen
exchange of expectations is present; NO when it is
absent)
Prediction: Cooperation will be boosted among selﬁsh
types only when both (i) and (ii) are satisﬁed (Scenario 1);
alternatively, (i) or (ii) alone will boost cooperation to a
weaker degree (Scenario 2).
3 Experimental design and imple-
mentation
We implemented a repeated, two-phase linear public goods
game (voluntary contribution mechanism, or VCM), which
was preceded by a sorting experiment (which we conducted
online) in order to identify subjects’ types (de Oliveira et al.
2014). We opted for a two-person design, unlike Gächter &
Thöni (2005), who used a four-person design, or de Oliveira
et al. (2014), who used a three-person design. Although
there is no clear diﬀerences between these group sizes in
terms of theoretical implications, our choice was motivated
by the wish to focus on the eﬀect of beliefs about others’
expectations, which should be most straightforward in a two-
player game. For similar reasons, both Jin & Yamagishi
(1997) and Guala et al. (2013) also used two-person designs.
3.1 Online ranking experiment
The experiment was conducted at the Cognition and Behav-
ior Lab at Aarhus University (Denmark) in March of 2015.
All subjects gave their informed written consent.
We ﬁrst recruited subjects from the subject database to
participate in a study advertised as consisting of an online
experiment and a lab experiment for a subset of subjects
who completed the online experiment. They were informed
that they could earn up to 35 DKK in the online experiment
and up to 210 DKK in the lab experiment (if invited and
participate). 227 subjects (125 females, mean age=24, range
18–59) completed the online public goods game on Survey
Monkey, whereby we identiﬁed their types using the strategy
elicitation procedure (Fischbacher et al. 2001).
After the standard comprehension questions were cor-
rectly answered, subjects were asked to make two decisions,
one “unconditional” and the other “conditional”. The ﬁrst
(i.e., unconditional) decision pertained to the amount they
would contribute to the common pool out of the endowment
(20 points = 20 Danish Kroner) in a one-shot public goods
game (with two players, MPCR=.75). The second (i.e., con-
ditional) decision consisted of making a schedule of one’s
own contribution corresponding to the full range of possible
contributions (0–20 points) made by the other player. Sub-
jects were told (i) they would be randomly matched with a
partner; (ii) one of the two would be randomly picked as
the “unconditional” player, whose “unconditional” decision
was to be implemented, and the other’s corresponding “con-
ditional” decision would be implemented. The Nash/selﬁsh
strategy is to contribute zero in both decisions. However,
if both partners decide to make the maximum contribu-
tion (mutual full contribution), each would earn 30 points
whereaswhen neither contributes anything (mutual zero con-
tribution) they each would earn 20 points (points were con-
verted into DKK with 1 point=1 DKK). We identiﬁed three
types with the following criteria:
• “Conditional cooperator” (CC): n=128, or 56% of the
total number of subjects. These subjects increase con-
ditional contribution weakly monotonically, that is, as
their partner’s contribution increases, they increase own
contribution, or at least do not decrease it.2
• “Selﬁsh player” (SS): n=49 (22%). These subjects’
conditional contributions remain no more than ﬁve re-
gardless of the other player’s contribution.3
• “Other type”: n=50 (22%). Those who are neither CC
nor SS.
We checked the subjects for previous experience in the lab-
oratory. There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between CC and
SS types with regards to experience.
Subjects were informed at this stage that they may be in-
vited to the lab. In accordance with the protocol of the lab,
subjects were asked to provide their (CPR) identiﬁcation
number, so that their payment could be transferred directly
to their account. The average earning from the online exper-
iment was 24,45 DKK, which was paid electronically after
the experiment. Those who participated in the lab experi-
2Fischbacher et al. (2001, p. 401) include strategies that are not weakly
monotonic in a strict sense as long as there is “a highly signiﬁcant (at
the 1% level) and positive Spearman rank correlation coeﬃcient (between
own and others’ contribution)”. Our criterion is not statistical but rather
a mechanical application of the weak monotonicity. de Oliveira et al.’s
(2014) exact criterion is not clear from their phrasing: “a strategy proﬁle
of a conditional cooperator involves higher contributions as expectations of
others’ contributions increase”.
3Fischbacher et al. (2001, p.401) used the stricter criterion, according to
which free-riders’ conditional contribution is always zero. Since our overall
design is closest to de Oliveira et al. (2014), we used their more permissible
criterion, which classiﬁes ‘subjects who never give more than ﬁve [25% of
endowment] (footnote 5)’ as selﬁsh. de Oliveira et al. (2014) report that
“In the 21 decisions of the type elicitation task, over 90% of the decisions
for our selﬁsh subjects are zeroes, and over 98 % are either zero or one”
(footnote 5). Our results are similar (94.1% and 98.5%, respectively). Of
our 49 S-type subjects, 43 subjects always chose zero. 6 subjects’ schedules
(6*21=126) include positive contributions of 1 (46 times), 2 (11 times), and
3 (4 times).
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Table 1: Summary of the experimental design.
Type
Selﬁsh players (SSs) Conditional cooperators (CCs)
Information
Common knowledge (CK) SS_CK (n=10) CC_CK (n=12)
No common knowledge (NCK) SS_NCK (n=8) CC_NCK (n=16)
ment received this amount, plus whatever they earned during
the lab experiment, also electronically.
3.2 Lab Experiment
Following the online experiment a lab experiment was con-
ducted with 21 people identiﬁed as SSs and 29 people iden-
tiﬁed as CCs.4 The lab experiment used the same two-
person VCM with MCPR=0.75, but the conversion rate was
10 points=3 DKK. Instructions for phase 1 can be found in
Appendix 1. After reading the instructions all subjects had
to pass comprehension questions to continue.
As can be seen in Table 1, the lab experiment implemented
a 2x2 between-subject design with the following factors:
• Group Type: Conditional Cooperators (CCs) vs. Selﬁsh
Players(SSs);
• Information about the other player’s type: Common
Knowledge (CK) vs. No Common Knowledge (NCK).
We had 4 sessions, SSswith the CK condition (n=10), CCs
with the CK condition (n=12), SSs with the NCK condition
(n=8), CCs with the NCK condition (n=16).5 In the CK
condition, each subject was informed about (i) her own type
and about (ii) the other player’s type, and was also informed
that (iii) her partner knew exactly as much as she did. In
NCK, each subject was informed about (i) only.
Before the game started, each subject was asked three
questions designed to reveal their beliefs and attitudes about
social norms (Bicchieri, 2006): The questions were formu-
lated as follows:
• 1) How much do you think each person should con-
tribute to the group project in the ﬁrst round?
• 2)What do you think the average answer of all the other
subjects to the above question is?
• 3) You participated in an online experiment a couple
of weeks ago. How do you think you contributed com-
4There was no significant difference between the people who showed
up for the lab experiment and the people who opted out of participation in
the lab experiment in terms of age, gender, education level, studies of eco-
nomics/business/Maths, profit earned in online experiment or contribution
in online experiment.
5We had the fifth, mixed session with a small group (3 SSs and 1 CC).
We piloted skin conductance measurements with these subjects, and the
data from this session are not included in the following analysis.
pared to the majority of subjects in the experiment?
(1=less, 2=same, 3=more, 4=I don’t remember)
Responses to these questions made it possible to corroborate
the procedure by which we identiﬁed subjects’ types: selﬁsh
types should report believing that they contributed less than
the majority of the other subjects. This was indeed the case
(more on this later).
The public goods game was played in two phases, each
consisting of ten rounds. For the duration of each phase, sub-
jects remained in stable pairs (partner design), but the pairs
were shuﬄed and rematched prior to Phase 2. They were in-
formed of this arrangement prior to the experiment. The two
phases were identical except that in the second phase, but
not in the ﬁrst, each subject was prompted at the beginning
of each round to indicate how much s/he expected her/his
partner to contribute.6 The number each subject gave was
then communicated to their partner. Subjects were not in-
formed of this addition to the game until the beginning of the
ﬁrst round in second phase. This manipulation has the same
implementation advantage as the “cheap talk” that Cooper
et al. (1990) and Clark et al. (2001) used in coordination
games, namely, that in all sessions each subject has an iden-
tical role and can be given identical instructions. However,
while Cooper et al. (1990), as well as Clark et al. (2001),
asked their subjects to state their own intention in advance,
we asked subjects to state how much they expected their
partner to choose. Concretely, Cooper et al. (1990) asked
subjects to complete the following sentence: “I INTEND
TO CHOOSE___” (i.e., exchange of own intention), while
we asked our subjects to respond to the following question:
“How many points do you expect that the other subject in
your group will contribute in this period?” (exchange of own
expectation). This design reﬂects our focus on the role of
expectations.7 All subjects were prompted at the beginning
of each round to make a non-binding, non-incentivized an-
nouncement to this question. Each player was then informed
as to what her partner had announced prior to making a
decision as to how much to contribute in that round.
6This prediction was not incentivized, so it was “cheap talk” (see Craw-
ford 1998 for a survey of “cheap talk” experiments).
7Isaac and Walker (1988), in their VCM experiment, allowed more
field-like face-to-face communication (max 4 minutes) with some imposed
rules on what can be communicated (such as no side-payments outside the
experiment).
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Table 2: Comparison of unconditional online contributions
by selfish and conditional cooperator types, standard devia-
tions in parentheses.
SS CC
CK 5.100 (7.652) 15.417 (5.823)
NCK 5.714 (6.701) 12.643 (6.890)
Total 5.353 (7.185) 13.923 (6.449)
U = 365.000;
p = .000
U = 33.000;
p = .837
U = 67.500;
p = .376
The lab public goods game was programmed and imple-
mented using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), and
presented to subjects seated at desktop computers with 22
inch monitors (active display area: 474 mm x 296 mm).
They gave their responses using mouse devices and key-
boards. Each session lasted about 1 hour, and the average
earning from the lab experiment was 160.92 DKK (about
22 euro). This includes a show-up fee of 40 DKK (about 5
euro).
4 Results
4.1 Online experiment and belief elicitation
We ran a pre-analysis on the online contributions to check
that the subjects in the CK and NCK conditions did not
initially diﬀer in their online contributions in a way that
could bias the further analyses. The descriptive data of
the unconditional contributions in the online experiment,
arranged by type, is shown in Table 2 (with Mann-Whitney
U tests of diﬀerences). We found no apparent diﬀerences
between the subjects relegated to the CK and NCK groups,
for either the selﬁsh or conditional cooperator types. Despite
the small sample size, the conditional cooperators clearly
contributing more to their partners than the selﬁsh players.
We also found that the unconditional online contributions
did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the contributions made in
the ﬁrst round of the lab-based experiment. Apparently,
receiving the feedback about their “type” had no eﬀect on
the subjects’ subsequent contribution.
Finally, themajority of selﬁsh subjects (accurately) judged
that they had given less than the average, and the majority
of conditional cooperators judged they had given either the
same or higher amounts than the average. However, the two
types of subjects did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly in their beliefs
about how much one should give in the ﬁrst round and their
predictions of what others think one should give did not
diﬀer across types.
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Figure 1: Average contributions by round and phase. In the
second phase, rounds 11–20, subjects stated their expecta-
tions.
4.2 Impacts of common knowledge and sig-
naling of expectations
Figure 1 shows the average contributions across rounds and
conditions in the two experimental phases (for more detailed
information about contributions across rounds, refer to Ap-
pendix 2). It is evident that the trajectories are quite diﬀerent,
especially for the subjects in the SS-CK condition. While
in the ﬁrst phase the trend follows a downward slope, in the
second phase (with expectations) the SS-CK contributions
rise with each time point to reach their peak between rounds
17 and 19, then drop drastically to zero in the ﬁnal round.
The diﬀerences between the CK- and NCK-selﬁsh types’
contributions in Phase 1 (no communication of expectations)
and Phase 2 (communication of expectations) are striking:
while the NCK subjects contribute more in the later rounds
of Phase 1 as the CK subjects’ contributions drop, in Phase
2 this trend is altered by the fact that the selﬁsh subjects in
the CK condition contribute as much, and even more than
the conditional cooperators, whereas the contributions in the
NCK condition fall around round 14 and do not reach the
same levels of eﬃciency. Looking at the same ﬁgure, the
contributions between conditional cooperators in both the
CK and NCK condition do not seem to diﬀer to a signiﬁcant
degree and follow a similar pattern, though slightly higher
in the case when the type is common knowledge.
Put simply, cooperation is increased in selﬁsh types if and
only if they communicate expectations and have common
knowledge of their types. The communication of expecta-
tions by itself has no clear eﬀect on any other group, and
common knowledge alone does not improve the cooperation
of the selﬁsh types.
Given the small sample size, we report tests of only the
results most relevant to the main hypotheses. For the means
of rounds 1–9, SS-CK was non-signiﬁcantly lower than
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SS-NCK for Phase 1 but, importantly, higher in Phase 2
(p = .008, 1-tailed Wilcoxon test using pairs as the units of
analysis).8 For the CC subjects the diﬀerence between CC-
CK and CC-NCK was not signiﬁcant in either Phase. As
should be expected, CC subjects contributed more than SS
subjects in both CK and NCK conditions except for the CK
condition in Phase 2, although this diﬀerence was signiﬁcnt
only for the CK condition in Phase 1 (p = .004 one tailed)
and the NCK condition in Phase 2 (p = .025).
Partners’ expectations had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the con-
tributions, namely that with every 1-point increase in the
expectation, the contribution increased on average by .390
(see Figure 2 for the relationship between the average con-
tribution and expectation in each condition). Finally, the
end-game eﬀect was observed to some extent in all condi-
tions. The most drastic decrease from the mean of the ﬁrst
9 rounds to the last round appeared in the SS-CK group
(p = .010 in Phase 1, .000 in Phase 2, by one-tailed t test
with pairs as the unit of analysis). The drop was signiﬁcant
for the CC-NCK condition (p = .008 in Phase 1, .028 in
Phase 2) but was not signiﬁcant for the CC-CK and NCK-SS
conditions in either Phase.
8A less conservative analysis (based on the lmer() function in the lme4
package in R) treated pair as a random effect and subject as the unit of
analysis, yielding p = .001. With a larger sample, this analysis would
be preferred, but in this case the assumption of homoscedastic error was
seriously violated. Here and elsewhere, we rely on the analysis by pairs.
In no case was the random-effect analysis significant at p < .05 when the
analysis by pairs was not.
4.3 Own and partner expectations
In an exploratory analysis of the relationships between own
and partner’s expectations and subsequent contributions, we
found no correlation between own or partner’s expectations
on contribution, from one round to the next, in SS-NCK.
Contributions in ﬁrst round signiﬁcantly correlated with
one’s own expectations for SS-CKandCC-NCK. ForCC-CK
contributions are correlated with own and other’s expecta-
tions.
Speciﬁcally, Kendall’s tau-b correlations between the
three variables were calculated separately for each round
of Phase 2 in the four conditions. The SS-NCK group dif-
fered from the rest in that neither the other’s nor one’s own
expectations were signiﬁcantly correlated with the actual
contributions of the subjects across most of the rounds (the
only exception being a signiﬁcant, positive correlation be-
tween the subjects’ own expectations and their contributions
in R3: τb = .816; p < .01). Interestingly, in the SS-CK and
the CC-NCKgroups, the contributions in the ﬁrst roundwere
signiﬁcantly correlated with one’s own stated expectations
(τb = .764; p < .01; τb = .678; p < .01, respectively), but not
with that of the partner (τb = .422; p = .124; τb = .199; p
= .383, respectively). In the CC-CK group, the correlation
between one’s own and the partner’s expectation with the
contribution was the same (τb = .761; p < .01), while they
were also signiﬁcantly inter-correlated (τb = .548; p < .05),
which doesn’t allow for a straightforward interpretation.
Finally, in the last round expectations are signiﬁcantly
correlated with contributions for SS-CK, CC-CK and CC-
NCK. In the last round, the shadow of the future is removed.
Here, the expectations of the SS-CK players are signiﬁcantly
negatively correlated with their contributions (τb = −.667; p
< .05), whereas in both the CC-CK and CC-NCK conditions,
players’ expectations are signiﬁcantly positively correlated
with their contributions (τb = .616, p < .05; τb = .681; p <
.01, respectively).
5 Discussion
The present study was designed to reveal conditions under
which group-cooperation heuristics among selﬁsh players
would be triggered. The ﬁndings clearly support Scenario 1,
according to which the heuristics is triggered only when both
conditions (i: realization of no possibility of free-riding and
need for cooperation to make money) and (ii: realization of
other’s expectations of cooperation) are satisﬁed, but not by
two conditions individually (Scenario 2).
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Let us ﬁrst consider what happened in Phase 1.9 The com-
mon knowledge manipulation had opposite eﬀects on CCs
and SSs. While CCs in the CK condition (unsurprisingly)
contributed more than in the NCK condition, this pattern
was reversed for SSs. The slightly negative impact of com-
mon knowledge on SSs’ contributions merits close attention.
This indicates the ineﬀectiveness of condition (i) indepen-
dently to trigger group-cooperation heuristics among selﬁsh
players (in line with Scenario 1.b not 2.b). Indeed, the result
suggests that making common knowledge of selﬁsh types
explicit could be counterproductive. de Oliveira et al. (2014,
125), who used the same CK/NCK treatments, also report
that the decay of the contributions among SSs in the CK was
steeper, which is consistent with our results. How should we
account for this possible negative impact of common knowl-
edge? One plausible account is that the explicit common
knowledge suppressed the prospect of strategic cooperation
under ambiguity about the other’s type, as we discussed in
Section 2.2 above.
Let us now turn to Phase 2. Here, signaling of expecta-
tions dramatically increased contributions among SSs in the
CK condition, as opposed to the NCK condition. This sug-
gests that common knowledge of selﬁsh types (condition (i))
and signaling of expectations (condition (ii)) jointly trigger
group-cooperation heuristics. It is also important to note that
condition (ii), like condition (i), appears to be insuﬃcient on
its own as even a weak trigger for group-cooperation heuris-
tics (in line with Scenario 1.c). Contra the default confor-
mity preference hypothesis, expectations alone do not seem
to facilitate cooperation among selﬁsh subjects. Although
subjects’ contributions are highly correlated with the amount
that their partners expect them to contribute (Figure 2), the
correlation between each subject’s own behavior and her/his
partner’s expectations was apparently higher in the CK con-
ditions than in NCK conditions (for both SSs and CCs). In
addition, selﬁsh subjects’ expectations were higher in the CK
than in the NCK condition. That is, selﬁsh players, who did
not know the other’s type did not signal high expectations
to begin with, and the other selﬁsh players did not conform
even to such moderate expectations. Thus, neither (i) nor (ii)
is independently suﬃcient.
In view of the strong interaction that we observed between
common knowledge of (selﬁsh) types and the signaling of
expectations, we conclude that condition (i) is dependent
on (ii) as a trigger of group-cooperation heuristics, in line
with Scenario 1. Presumably the selﬁsh types in the CK
condition without expectations were aware that there were
9An anonymous reviewer pointed out the possible order effect of Phases
1 and 2. We agree that this possibility needs to be studied experimentally,
but given practical limitations of the present study we opted for this order,
mainly because it is the most natural way to see additional impact of sig-
naling of expectations. Swapping the order of the two phases may create
some carry-over effect of signaling to the next phase, which would be an
interesting finding, but finding such an effect has not been a focus of our
study here.
no cooperators around to free-ride on, and that they would
therefore have to cooperate in order to make money. But
this was insuﬃcient to make them cooperate; indeed, it had,
if anything, a negative impact on contributions. This is not
surprising given that selﬁsh subjects in the CK condition
must not only decide that mutual cooperation is the best
available option but must also have some assurance that their
partner also sees it that way – and also that their partner
believes that they see it that way (because otherwise their
partner might be reluctant to contribute despite being willing
to). The opportunity to announce expectations, introduced
in Phase 2 of the experiment, provided selﬁsh players with a
chance to signal such an assurance.
We see at least two distinct ways in which others’ expec-
tations and common knowledge of types jointly contribute
to successful cooperation in line with Scenario 1.a. First,
the normative force of expectations may be ampliﬁed by in-
group favoritism (i.e., expectations matter more when they
come from in-group members). Second, common knowl-
edge of types may provide a rationale for each other’s expec-
tations, based on material self-interest, thus increasing their
credibility. Although these mechanisms would work in the
same direction, they are in fact distinct. We believe that our
data is better explained by the latter. Let us explain.
5.1 Solution thinking
How and when is common knowledge of types conducive to
selﬁsh cooperation? In order to see this, we need to look
somewhere other than to the orthodox best-reply reasoning
in game theory. Morton (2003) proposes such an alternative,
simulation-based model of reasoning, which he calls solu-
tion thinking (see alsomirror strategy, Hurley 2005; common
reasoning, Cubitt and Sugden 2014). Solution thinking pro-
ceeds in the following steps (cf. Guala 2016, ch. 7):
1. C is the obvious solution to the problem.
2. The other also thinks that C is the obvious solution to
the problem.
3. To achieve C, I must do ci and the other must do cj.
4. The other also thinks that I must do ci and she must do
cj.
5. Therefore, I do ci.
Steps 1 and 3 correspond to condition (i) of group-
cooperation heuristics: to realize that “since there is no one
to free-ride on, the only way to make money is to cooperate.”
But in order to arrive at Step 5, one needs some conﬁdence
that the other is thinking in the sameway (Step 2) and expect-
ing the same way (Step 4). One plausible interpretation of
the joint eﬀectiveness (and disjoint ineﬀectiveness) of com-
mon knowledge of type and signaling of expectations is that
the former activated Steps 1 and 3, and the latter Steps 2 and
4, thereby activating solution thinking. The announcement
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of (high) expectations in Phase 2 assured selﬁsh subjects in
the CK condition that their partner was also willing to try
a new strategy (Step 2), and also that their partner believed
that they did too (Step 4). This last step is crucial because, in
its absence, there would be uncertainty about whether one’s
partner might do her part. In contrast, these steps were not
activated in the NCK condition, because the pre-conditions
for simulation is missing (one could not eliminate the doubt:
“Is C the obvious solution to the other?”; nor could one make
clear sense of the other’s (high) expectation). We do not deny
the possibility that the normative power of expectations to
conform were at work, but the very strong end-game eﬀect
among selﬁsh players in the common knowledge condition
(basically no one conformed to others’ expectations) sug-
gests that the pressure to conform is not enough to motivate
cooperation in social dilemma.
This rather unorthodox explanation becomes more plau-
sible when we consider how the best-reply approach would
accommodate our observations. Selﬁsh cooperation is tradi-
tionally explained in terms of rational vs. boundedly rational
behavior. The former is formulated by Kreps et al. (1982),
and the latter by Selten and Stoecker (1986). But it would
be rather ad hoc to explain the shifts of behavior of selﬁsh
subjects in the CK condition from Phase 1 to Phase 2 by
saying that selﬁsh subjects were rational in Phase 1, but they
became less rational or more boundedly rational in Phase
2, where the only change introduced was the exchange of
expectations at the beginning of each round. This is not
coherent as an explanatory strategy. We therefore have good
reason to favor the solution thinking model.
The solution thinking model also generates unique and
testable predictions, which would be important for future re-
search to address. For example, the solution thinking model
predicts that targeting second-order beliefs (i.e., beliefs about
the other’s expectation), as in the present study, is more ef-
fective than targeting ﬁrst-order beliefs (i.e., belief about the
other’s behavior), e.g., by allowing subjects to announce their
own intentions. This is because the signaling of expectations
more directly targets step 4 of the solution thinking model.
The solution thinking model also predicts that it makes no
diﬀerence whether the expectation is framed in normative
or descriptive terms, e.g., “I believe that the other ought to
contribute X” vs. “I believe that the other will contribute
X”. This is because what triggers solution thinking is not a
preference for conformity per se but the conﬁdence that the
other is thinking in the same way. The conformity-based ex-
planation, in contrast, would predict a discrepancy between
the two conditions.
On a more general note, our results also highlight the
need of further investigation of subject types. There is much
uncertainty as to the characterization and stability of these
“types” (Moﬀatt, 2016, p. 10). Since conditional coopera-
tors are characterized by the dependence of their behavior on
beliefs about others’ behavior, this type cannot be identiﬁed
with a simple other-regarding utility function. Similarly, our
main results give us reason to doubt that selﬁsh players can be
identiﬁed with a ﬁxed utility function (i.e., with selﬁsh pref-
erences): even the behavior of a relatively well-established
category, namely selﬁsh types (or free-riders), turned out to
be sensitive to expectations. This is not to say that there is
no such thing as types at all. Indeed, we observed systematic
diﬀerences in the ways in which diﬀerent types responded
to our manipulations. Rather, what our results suggest is the
need to take diﬀerent ways of reasoning or thinking into ac-
count in addition to preferences when categorizing subjects
into types in the context of social dilemmas.
In particular, we might be able to categorize our self-
ish subjects (thus categorized based on our one-shot strat-
egy method) further into three types10: (1) unconditional
free-riders, who always contribute zero, regardless of be-
liefs about others’ types or behavior; (2) solution thinkers,
who contribute positive amounts if they believe there are
no cooperators to free-ride on, and this amount is positively
correlated with others’ expectation of their contribution; and
(3) strategic cooperators, who contribute if they believe they
are playing against a conditional cooperator. A fully struc-
tural ﬁnite mixture modelling approach (Moﬀatt, 2016, ch.
8) should be used to precisely specify these types and sys-
tematically investigate their distribution. The small sample
size of the present study precludes such an approach, or
making conclusive inferences about the dynamics of self-
ish cooperation.11 Nevertheless, our ﬁndings are potentially
signiﬁcant, and point to promising new avenues of research
on the hitherto under-investigated psychological mechanism
(group-cooperation heuristics as solution thinking), which
could be exploitable to induce cooperation among those who
are conventionally categorized as selﬁsh or free-riders.
References
Bardsley, N. & Moﬀatt, P. G. (2007). The experimetrics of
public goods: Inferring motivations from contributions.
Theory and Decision, 62(2), 161–193.
Bicchieri, C. (2006). The grammar of society: The nature
and dynamics of social norms. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Billig, M. & Tajfel, H. (1973). Social categorization and
similarity in intergroup behaviour. European Journal of
Social Psychology, 3(1), 27–52.
10We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these types.
11This is due mainly to two factors: first, only a very small proportion
of the Danish student population seem to be Selfish-type in the first place;
and second, many of these Selfish-type subjects did not come to the lab
experiment. In contrast, conditional co-operators were more abundant. We
aim to secure resources to recruit a sufficient number of selfish-type subjects
in the future. In the meantime, we would like to invite replications of our
results concerning the effect of expectation-signaling on those categorized
as the selfish-type.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 2018 Expectation boosts cooperation 146
Brewer, M. B. (1979). In-group bias in the minimal in-
tergroup situation: A cognitive- motivational analysis.
Psychological bulletin, 86(2), 307–324.
Burlando, R. M. & Guala, F. (2005). Heterogeneous agents
in public goods experiments. Experimental Economics,
8, 35–54.
Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral game theory: Experiments
in strategic interaction. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Clark, K., Kay, S. & Sefton, M. (2001).When are Nash
equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis. In-
ternational Journal of Game Theory, 29, 495–515.
Cooper, R., DeJong, D. V., Forsythe, R. & Ross, T. W.
(1990). Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some
Experimental Results. The American Economic Review,
80(1), 218–233.
Crawford, V. (1998). A survey on experiments on commu-
nication via cheap talk. Journal of Economic Theory, 78,
286–298.
Cubitt, R. P. & Sugden, R. (2014). Common reasoning in
games: A Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of
rationality. Economics and Philosophy, 30(3), 285–329.
Dana, J., Cain, D. & Dawes, R. (2006). What you don’t
know won’t hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator
games. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 100, 193–201.
de Oliveira, A. C., Croson, R. T. & Eckel, C. (2014). One
bad apple? Heterogeneity and information in public good
provision. Experimental Economics, 1–20.
Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-
made economic experiments. Experimental economics,
10(2), 171–178.
Fischbacher, U. & Gächter, S. (2010). Heterogeneous Social
Preferences and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public
Goods. American Economic Review, 100(1), 541–56.
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S. & Fehr, E. (2001). Are people
conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods
experiment. Economics Letters, 71(3), 397–404.
Guala, F. (2016). Understanding Institutions: The Science
and Philosophy of Living Together. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Guala, F., Mittone, L. & Ploner, M. (2013). Group mem-
bership, team preferences, and expectations. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 86, 183–190.
Gunnthorsdottir, A., Houser, D. & Kevin McCabe, K.
(2007). Disposition, history and contributions in pub-
lic goods experiments, Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 62(2), 304–315.
Gächter, S. & Thöni, C. (2005). Social learning and volun-
tary cooperation among like-minded people. Journal of
the European Economic Association, 3(2–3), 303–314.
Heintz C., Celse J., Giardini F. & Max S. (2015) Facing
expectations: Those that we prefer to fulﬁl and those that
we disregard. Judgment and Decision Making, 10(5),
442–55.
Hurley, S. (2005). Social heuristics that make us smarter.
Philosophical Psychology, 18(5), 585–612.
Isaac, R. M. & Walker, J. M. (1988). Communication and
free-riding behavior: The voluntary contribution mecha-
nism. Economic inquiry, 26(4), 585–608.
Jin, N. & Yamagishi, T. (1997). Group heuristics in social
dilemma. Shakai Shinrigaku Kenkyu, 12(3), 190–198. [in
Japanese]
Junikka J., Molleman, L., van den Berg P., Weissing, F.J. &
Puurtinen, M. (2017). Assortment, but not knowledge of
assortment, aﬀects cooperation and individual success in
human groups. PLoS ONE 12(10), e0185859.
Kreps, D., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. & Wilson, R. (1982).
Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma, Journal of Economic Theory, 17, 245–52.
Moﬀatt, P. G. (2016). Experimetrics: Econometrics for
experimental economics. NewYork: PalgraveMacmillan.
Morton, A. (2003). The importance of being understood:
Folk psychology as ethics. New York: Routledge.
Ockenfels, A. & Werner, P. (2014). Beliefs and ingroup fa-
voritism. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
108, 453–462.
Selten, R. & Stoecker, R. (1986). End behavior in sequences
of ﬁnite prisoner’s dilemma supergames. A learning the-
ory approach. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organi-
zation, 7, 47–70.
Wit, A.P. & Wilke, H.A.M. (1992) The eﬀect of social cat-
egorization on cooperation in three types of social dilem-
mas, Journal of Economic Psychology, 13(1), 135–151.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 2018 Expectation boosts cooperation 147
Appendix 1: Instructions for phase 1.
Welcome to the Cognitive and Behavioural Lab at Aarhus University. You will be participating in an experiment ﬁnanced
by Aarhus University.
All participants in this experiment participated in a similar game online last week. The online experiment was the same
for all participants.
This experiment has two phases. These are the instructions to Phase 1 the instructions for Phase 2 will come later. All
participants have the same instructions. Please read them carefully.
It is not allowed to communicate with other participants during the experiment. If you have any questions please raise
your hand.
You can earn money in this experiment. Your income will be calculated by the computer during the experiment. You will
be told how much you earned and the amount will be transferred to your bank account. During the experiment we do not
calculate in kroner but in experimental points. At the end the points you earn will be converted into kroner. The points are
converted into kroner with following conversion rate:
10 points = 3 kroner.
All participants are randomly selected into groups of two participants. Thus you are not necessarily seated next to the
other person in your group. You will remain in the same group throughout the ﬁrst phase of the experiment but you will
never receive any information about who these people are and they will not be informed of your identity.
These are the rules:
Phase 1 has 10 periods. In the beginning of each period each participant receives 20 points. We call this his/her
endowment. You now have to choose how you want to invest your endowment. You can put some or all in a project or
keep them to yourself. The consequences of your choice are shown below. In the beginning of each period you will see the
following screen on your computer:
Number of periods in phase 1 and which period you are in now is shown in the top left corner. Top right corner show
how many seconds you have left to make your decision. You should make your decision before the clock goes to zero. The
program is in English.
Your Endowment in the beginning of each period is 20 points. You decide how many points you wish tom contribute to
the project by typing a number from 0–20. When you choose how many points to contribute you automatically choose how
many points to keep to yourself. This is your Endowment (20 points) minus your contribution to the project.
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Your income for the period = (20 – your contribution) + (0,75*(sum of contributions in your group))
When you have typed your contribution please press "OK". You choice have now been registered and can no longer be
changed.
When the other participant in your group has decided on his/her contribution and pressed “OK” you will see following
screen:
We have blanked out the numbers but to get an idea you can see what information the screen will reveal. The screen shows
first Your contribution to the project, then the Total contributions. Below it states the Income from the points you kept in
this period, then your Income from the project and below that Your income in this period.
As explained above your income consists of two parts:
1. The points you kept to yourself = 20 point – the points you contributed to the project
2. Income from the project, which is calculated in the following way: Your income from the project = 0,75 * (”sum of
all contributions to the project in your group”) Therefore the income from the project is the same for all participants
in your group. Assume for example that the sum of contributions to the project is 20 points. Then you and the other
participants in your group will receive 0.75*20=15 points from the project.
So your income for the period = The points you kept to yourself + Income from the project.
If you have any questions please raise your hand and we will come to you.
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Appendix 2: Mean individual contributions across rounds 1–10, Phase 1, and mean contributions and expectations in
rounds 11–20, Phase 2, across conditions. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Phase 1
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10
SS-CK (n = 10)
Contribution 8.800 7.500 7.900 6.500 5.500 4.400 4.800 4.900 3.100 1.140
(8.203) (7.649) (7.978) (8.182) (6.916) (5.211) (5.903) (6.488) (4.977) (2.271)
SS-NCK (n = 8)
Contribution 10.250 8.875 10.250 9.125 11.875 10.750 12.875 9.500 9.125 7.500
(7.459) (7.846) (7.402) (7.736) (5.939) (6.735) (7.120) (8.452) (9.230) (10.351)
CC-CK (n = 12)
Contribution 15.000 16.250 16.333 16.583 16.167 16.667 17.333 17.833 17.750 13.667
(6.368) (4.901) (4.292) (4.033) (4.629) (4.677) (3.798) (3.738) (4.634) (8.038)
CC-NCK (n = 16)
Contribution 13.313 13.438 13.563 14.375 14.813 15.375 15.313 15.438 15.813 10.750
(6.172) (5.750) (6.491) (6.386) (5.648) (5.476) (5.338) (6.450) (5.180) (8.505)
Phase 2
R11 R12 R13 R14 R15 R16 R17 R18 R19 R20
SS-CK (n=10)
Contribution 12.100 15.700 17.300 18.500 19.100 19.600 19.800 20.000 18.000 .200
(5.626) (5.579) (4.373) (3.171) (1.912) (.843) (.632) (.000) (6.325) (.632)
Expectation 11.700 14.700 17.400 17.900 18.600 19.400 19.800 20.000 20.000 16.200
(6.750) (5.774) (4.222) (3.479) (2.271) (1.350) (.632) (.000) (.000) (8.011)
SS-NCK (n=8)
Contribution 8.750 11.625 10.875 9.250 5.000 4.500 7.250 7.375 7.250 5.000
(8.763) (6.739) (8.132) (8.155) (7.071) (6.633) (6.316) (8.245) (10.025) (9.258)
Expectation 10.625 8.375 12.500 9.875 11.875 9.500 10.875 11.250 12.125 12.250
(6.781) (6.610) (6.949) (8.576) (7.529) (7.131) (6.642) (7.723) (8.097) (10.167)
CC-CK (n=12)
Contribution 17.333 17.750 17.750 18.083 18.250 18.167 18.000 18.000 17.583 15.583
(4.355) (4.351) (4.351) (4.274) (3.957) (4.303) (4.671) (4.671) (4.699) (6.612)
Expectation 17.250 19.167 19.167 18.583 18.667 18.583 18.583 18.750 18.583 18.167
(3.671) (1.946) (1.946) (3.630) (3.085) (3.630) (3.630) (3.108) (3.630) (3.738)
CC-NCK (n=16)
Contribution 15.813 15.813 17.563 16.750 17.938 17.250 17.188 16.188 16.250 13.125
(4.385) (5.913) (3.983) (6.846) (4.389) (6.768) (6.316) (7.064) (7.188) (9.465)
Expectation 15.313 16.375 17.563 17.313 18.375 19.875 19.063 17.625 18.687 17.500
(4.270) (4.856) (3.577) (5.474) (3.442) (.500) (2.720) (5.058) (2.983) (5.477)
